Main Content

aka – Indian Mujahidin; Islamic Security Force-Indian Mujahideen (ISF-IM)

history – formed as an ultra-conservative Islamic movement circa 2004 from remnants of the radical youth organization Students Islamic Movement of India; responsible for dozens of bomb attacks throughout India since 2005 and the deaths of hundreds of civilians; maintains ties to other terrorist entities including Pakistan-based Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Harakat ul-Jihad Islami; outlawed in India in 2010; in 2016, was increasingly linked to the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS); six IM operatives were identified in an ISIS propaganda video threatening attacks on India, and that same year, an IM cell linked to ISIS was reportedly plotting attacks on multiple targets in India; Indian authorities claimed they disrupted bombing plots by the group in 2015 and 2017; did not publicly claim any attacks in 2018 or 2019

goals – establish Islamic rule in India; stated goal is to carry out terrorist operations against Indians for their perceived oppression of Muslims

leadership and organization – Indian security services have captured or killed a number of alleged leaders of the group; currently, brothers Mohammed Riyaz BHATKAL and Iqbal BHATKAL are reportedly attempting to lead IM from Karachi, Pakistan; organization is unknown but probably operates in small, loosely connected networks and cells

areas of operation – has conducted attacks throughout India since 2005; has expanded its operations into Nepal, which is now the biggest hub for IM operatives; also operates in Pakistan

targets, tactics, and weapons – known for carrying out multiple coordinated bombings in crowded areas against Indian and Western civilian and economic targets, including restaurants and commercial centers; attackers typically use improvised explosive devices

strength – current strength unknown but has diminished from its height in the late 2000s, and some members have defected to ISIS

financial and other support – probably receives funding and support from other terrorist organizations, as well as from unspecified donors in Pakistan and the Middle East

designation – placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 19 September 2011

aka – Islamic Jihad Group; IJG; Islomiy Jihod Ittihodi; al-Djihad al-Islami; Dzhamaat Modzhakhedov; Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan; Jamiat al-Jihad al-Islami; Jamiyat; The Jamaat Mojahedin; The Kazakh Jama’at; The Libyan Society

history – emerged in 2002 as a splinter movement of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) after internal splits over goals; originally known as the Islamic Jihad Group but was renamed Islamic Jihad Union in 2005; committed to overthrowing the government of Uzbekistan, but unlike IMU, also has a global agenda as demonstrated by its attacks on Afghan, Coalition, and US forces in Afghanistan and its involvement in the Syrian civil war; pledged allegiance to the Afghan Taliban in August 2015 and participated in Taliban attacks on the Afghan city of Kunduz, as well as Afghan military bases; as late as 2019, fighters were participating in the Syrian conflict as part of a coalition of al-Qa’ida-linked terrorist groups

goals – overthrow the Uzbek government and replace it with an Islamic state; drive foreign forces out of Afghanistan and destabilize the government; support al-Qa’ida’s efforts to create an Islamic State in Syria

leadership and organization – leadership unknown; founded and previously led by Najmiddin JALALOV, who died in September 2009; organization also unknown but probably operates in a loose network of cells

areas of operation – historically operated in Uzbekistan, with members scattered throughout Central Asia and Europe; most active in northern Afghanistan, as well as in Syria

targets, tactics, and weapons – targets international and Afghan military and security forces in Afghanistan and Syrian regime forces using a variety of guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics; has attacked security checkpoints, law enforcement facilities, market places, and foreign embassies in Uzbekistan, often with suicide bombers; in 2007, an IJU cell in Germany (known as the “Sauerland Cell”) attempted to construct and detonate a series of car bombs to carry out a mass attack, but the militants were arrested before they could carry out the attack and were ultimately convicted; fighters are armed with small arms, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, antiaircraft weapons, and various explosives including improvised explosive devices and car bombs

strength – assessed in 2019 to have 100 to 200 members

financial and other support – specific sources of support are unknown but probably receives assistance from allied terrorist groups and sympathetic donors

designation – placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 17 June 2005

aka – Islamic Party of Uzbekistan; Islamskaia partiia Turkestana;, byvshee Islamskoe dvizhenie Uzbekistana; Islamic Movement of Turkistan

history – formed in the early 1990s as a Sunni Muslim armed group in Uzbekistan's part of the Ferghana Valley, where the Uzbek, Kyrgyz, and Tajik borders converge; moved to Pakistan after the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001; operated primarily along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and in northern Afghanistan, where it fought against international forces despite its goal of setting up an Islamic state in Uzbekistan; was closely allied to al-Qa’ida, the Afghan Taliban, and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and frequently conducted joint operations with those organizations until August 2015, when a significant faction, including its top leadership, pledged loyalty to the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and began cooperating with ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K); numerous IMU members were subsequently reported to have been killed in clashes between ISIS-K and its former Taliban allies; some members reportedly traveled to Syria to fight; operational tempo has decreased in recent years, and it did not claim any attacks in 2019

goals – overthrow the Uzbek Government and establish an Islamic state; drive international forces out of Afghanistan

leadership and organization – current leadership unknown; last known leader was Osman GHAZI (aka Odil Osman), who was reportedly killed in November 2015; organization unknown but probably structured as a network of cells

areas of operation –operates primarily along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and in northern Afghanistan; also active in Syria, Central Asia, and Turkey

targets, tactics, and weapons – targets Afghanistan, Coalition, and US military forces in Afghanistan using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics, including ambushes, assassinations, kidnappings, and suicide bombings; typically uses small arms and light weapons, mortars, rockets, and various explosives, including car bombs and suicide vests

strength – unknown; estimated to have 200-300 members

financial and other support – receives support from a large Uzbek diaspora, allied terrorist organizations, and sympathizers from Europe, Central and South Asia, and the Middle East; also engages in narcotics trafficking and conducts kidnappings for ransom

designation – placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 25 September 2000

aka – Islamic Revolutionary Guards, Pasdaran (Guards), Revolutionary Guards, Sepah (Corps), Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami; Quds Force

history – formed in May 1979 in the immediate aftermath of Shah Mohammad Reza PAHLAVI’s fall, as leftists, nationalists, and Islamists jockeyed for power; while the interim prime minister controlled the government and state institutions, such as the army, followers of Ayatollah Ruhollah KHOMEINI organized counterweights, including the IRGC, to protect the Islamic revolution; the IRGC’s command structure bypassed the elected president and went directly to KHOMEINI; the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) transformed the IRGC into more of a conventional fighting force with its own ground, air, naval, and special forces, plus control over Iran’s strategic missile and rocket forces; as of 2020, the IRGC is highly institutionalized and a parallel military force to Iran’s regular armed forces (Artesh); it is heavily involved in internal security and has significant influence in the political and economic spheres of Iranian society, as well as Iran’s foreign policy; its special operations forces are known as the Qods Force which specializes in foreign missions, providing advice, funding, guidance, material support, training, and weapons to militants in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, as well as extremist groups, including HAMAS, Hizballah, Kata’ib Hizballah, and Palestine Islamic Jihad

goals – protect Iran’s Islamic revolution and the state; spread Iranian/Shia influence; provide internal security, including border control, law enforcement, and suppressing domestic opposition; influence Iran’s politics, economy, and foreign policy

leadership and organization – General Hossein SALAMI is the commander of the IRGC; Brigadier General Ismail QAANI is the commander of the Qods Force; organized along the lines of a traditional conventional military force with Ground Forces, Navy (includes marines), Aerospace Force (includes the strategic missile forces), Cyber Command, Qods Force (special operations), and Basij Paramilitary Forces (a.k.a. Popular Mobilization Army)

areas of operation – headquartered in Tehran; active throughout Iran and the Middle East region, as well as Afghanistan, Gaza, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen; has a worldwide capability to commit attacks if Iranian leadership deems it appropriate; in recent years, Qods Force planning for terror attacks has been uncovered and disrupted in a number of countries worldwide, including Albania, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Kenya, Turkey, and the United States

targets, tactics, and weapons – targets Israel; Sunni regimes perceived as a threat, particularly Saudi Arabia; the Islamic State; US military forces in the Middle East; Iranian dissidents; has the capability to fight conventionally and conduct a wide-range of terrorist-type attacks; also makes extensive use of proxy and partner forces such as Hizballah; armed as a conventional military with typical ground, air, and naval platforms and weapons

strength – estimates vary; assessed in 2019 to be approximately 125-190,000, including the Qods Force, whose estimated size ranges from 5,000-15,000; also controls the 90,000-member Basij Paramilitary Force, which augments internal security, suppresses domestic opposition, and can increase to several hundred thousand during a major mobilization

financial and other support – receives a portion of the Iranian defense budget, by some estimates as much as 50%; IRGC-linked companies control up to 20% of Iran’s economy; Qods Force also exerts control over strategic industries, commercial services, and black-market enterprises, and has engaged in large-scale illicit finance schemes and money laundering

designation – placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 15 April 2019

aka – ISIS in the Philippines (ISIS-P); ISIL Philippines; ISIL in the Philippines; IS Philippines (ISP); Islamic State in the Philippines; Islamic State in Iraq and Syria in Southeast Asia; Dawlah Islamiyah; Dawlatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masrik; Dawlatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Mashriq; IS East Asia Division; ISIS Branch in the Philippines; ISIS “Philippines province,” Maute Group

history – Islamic militants in the Philippines initially pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2014, however the group officially formed in 2016 with now-deceased leader Isnilon HAPILON as the first amir; ISIS media claimed its first attack in the Philippines against Philippine soldiers on Mindanao Island in March 2016; in May 2017, ISIS-EA fighters stormed and captured the city of Marawi on Mindanao; five months of subsequent fighting for the city between the militants and the Philippine military resulted in nearly 900 militants and more than 160 Philippine soldiers killed; over 300,000 residents were forced to flee the area during the fighting; in 2018, the group conducted the first ever suicide attack in the Philippines that year; ISIS-EA has since claimed several additional suicide and other high-profile bombings and remains active in 2020

goals – create an Islamic state in the southern Philippines and across Southeast Asia adhering to ISIS’s strict interpretation of sharia

leadership and organization – currently unknown; leader Hatib SAWADJAAN reportedly killed by Philippine troops in mid-2020;  SAWADJAAN was the former commander of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and succeeded HAPILON as the leader of ISIS-EA after the latter’s death in the Marawi conflict in 2017; the leaders of some ISIS-EA factions reportedly did not support SAWADJAAN; in addition to ASG, the Maute Group, Ansar al-Khilafah Philippines, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters factions have pledged allegiance to ISIS-EA, but operate autonomously and maintain their own leaders and organizational structures

areas of operation – mostly in the southern Philippines, especially the Sulu Archipelago and western and central Mindanao; probably has an unknown number of members in the capital, Manila

targets, tactics, and weapons – targets Philippine security forces but increasingly targets non-Muslim civilians; has attacked government targets, military bases and security checkpoints, churches, internet cafés, resorts, and street festivals; utilizes guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics, including armed assaults, mortar attacks, and improvised explosive device attacks using suicide bombers and road-side devices; weapons include small arms, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and hand grenades

strength – estimated in 2020 to have 300-600 fighters

financial and other support – receives some financial assistance from ISIS core, but mostly relies on criminal activities such as kidnappings for ransom and extortion; maintains training camps in remote areas under its control and acquires weapons through smuggling and captured or black market purchases of Philippine military arms; estimated to have a few dozen foreign fighters (mostly Indonesians and some Malaysians) who tend to assume key responsibilities such as financial and communications/media facilitators, bomb-makers, trainers, and attack planners/perpetrators

designation – placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 28 February 2018

aka – Islamic State-Sinai Province (IS-SP); ISIS-Sinai Province; ISIS-Sinai; ISIL Sinai Province (ISIL-SP); The State of Sinai; Wilayat Sinai; Islamic State in the Sinai; Ansar Bayt al-Maqdes; Ansar Beit al-Maqdis; Jamaat Ansar Beit al-Maqdis; Jamaat Ansar Beit al-Maqdis fi Sinaa; Ansar Jerusalem; Supporters of Jerusalem; Supporters of the Holy Place; Allies of the Holy House

history – began as Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM), which rose to prominence in 2011 following the uprisings in Egypt; ABM was responsible for attacks against Egyptian and Israeli government and security elements and against tourists in Egypt; in November 2014, ABM officially declared allegiance to ISIS; has since conducted a bloody insurgency against Egyptian security forces under the ISIS banner and become one of the most deadly of the ISIS affiliates; the Egyptian military has deployed more than 40,000 troops to the Sinai to suppress the insurgency; continued to be active in 2020

goals – spread the Islamic caliphate by eliminating the Egyptian government, destroying Israel, and establishing an Islamic emirate in the Sinai

leadership and organization – current leader unknown; organization also unknown but reportedly has sections or branches for security, military affairs, bomb-making, and media operations

areas of operation – operations are conducted primarily in the Sinai Peninsula, but its reach periodically extends to Cairo, the Egyptian Nile Valley, and Gaza

targets, tactics, and weapons – mainly targets Egyptian security forces, particularly checkpoints, convoys, and bases; conducts ambushes, assassinations, complex attacks involving dozens of attackers, car and suicide bombings, kidnappings, public executions, and road side bombings attacks; conducted large armed assaults on a military base in 2018 and on the Egyptian city of Sheikh Zuweid in 2014; both attacks included dozens of fighters with small arms, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, car bombs, and suicide bombers; also targets Egyptian Government facilities and officials, oil pipelines, tourists, religious minorities, government-allied tribes, places of worship, and airliners; two of its most deadly attacks were the 2017 assault by suicide bombers and gunmen on an Egyptian Sufi mosque that killed more than 300 and the 2015 bombing of a Russian airliner from the Egyptian resort town of Sharm el-el-Sheikh, which killed all 231 on board

strength – estimated in 2019 to have 800-1,200 fighters

financial and other support – receives funding from external actors, including core ISIS, and from smuggling; weapons reportedly are smuggled in from Gaza, Sudan, and Libya

designation – placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 9 April 2014

aka – Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP); Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-West Africa (ISIL-WA); Islamic State of Iraq and Syria West Africa Province; ISIS West Africa Province; ISIS-West Africa (ISIS-WA); Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya

history – created in 2016 when a faction of Boko Haram broke off and pledged allegiance to ISIS; the split occurred primarily because of the indiscriminate violence Boko Haram inflicted on Muslims; since its founding, has waged an insurgency against the Nigerian Government, overrunning dozens of military bases and killing hundreds of soldiers; by 2019, reportedly controlled hundreds of square miles of territory in the Lake Chad region where it governed according to a strict interpretation of Islamic law and attempted to cultivate support among local civilians by focusing on filling gaps in governance and government; continued conducting attacks through 2020

goals – implement ISIS’s strict interpretation of sharia and replace regional governments with an Islamic state

leadership and organization – reportedly Ba LAWAN; previously led by Abu Abdullah ibn Umar al-BARNAWI; growing centralization of power; shura and military commanders hold influence

areas of operation – primarily in Northeast Nigeria in the Lake Chad region but also operates in southeast Niger, northern Cameroon, and areas of Chad near Lake Chad

targets, tactics, and weapons – seeks to delegitimize the Nigerian Government by focusing its attacks on security forces, state-sponsored civilian defense groups, government targets, and individuals who collaborate with the government; attacks military bases and mobile columns; in November 2018, fighters overran a military base, killing 100 soldiers; employs ambushes, hit-and-run attacks, targeted killings, road side bombs, and kidnappings of security forces personnel; also conducts attacks against Boko Haram and engaged in the kidnapping and murder of aid workers and Christians, as well as civilians who aid the Nigerian military; fighters are typically equipped with small arms, light and heavy machine guns, vehicle mounted weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, mines, rockets, and improvised explosive devices

strength – estimated in 2020 to have between 3,500 and 5,000 active fighters

financial and other support – receives some funding from core ISIS and local sources, including kidnappings-for-ransom and taxation and extortion practices; has captured a considerable number of vehicles, weapons, and ammunition from the Nigerian military

designation – placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 28 February 2018

aka – Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL); Islamic State; Islamic State in Iraq; ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-’Iraq wa-sh-Sham; Daesh; Dawla al Islamiya; al-Qa’ida in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia; al-Qa’ida in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Tawhid; Jam’at al-Tawhid Wa’al-Jihad; Tanzeem Qa’idat al Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; the Monotheism and Jihad Group; the Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers; the Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in Iraq; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in the Land of the Two Rivers; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in Iraq; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in the Land of the Two Rivers; the Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers; al-Zarqawi Network; Al-Furqan Establishment for Media Production

history – formed in the 1990s under the name al-Tawhid wal-Jihad by Jordanian militant Abu Mus’ab al-ZARQAWI to oppose the presence of Western military forces in the Middle East and the West’s support for, and the existence of, Israel; in late 2004, ZARQAWI pledged allegiance to al-Qa’ida (AQ) and the group became known as al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI); ZARQAWI led AQI against US and Coalition Forces in Iraq until his death in June 2006; in October 2006, renamed itself the Islamic State in Iraq; in 2013, adopted the moniker ISIS to express regional ambitions and expanded operations to Syria where it established control of a large portion of eastern Syria; in June 2014, then ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-BAGHDADI declared a worldwide Islamic caliphate with its capital in Raqqa, Syria; by 2015, held an area in Iraq and Syria with an estimated population of between 8 and 12 million, including the Iraqi city of Mosul; imposed a brutal version of Islamic law in the areas under its control and became known for brutality against perceived enemies, including the murder of large numbers of civilians, its large contingent of foreign fighters, and a substantial social media presence; by the end of 2017, had lost control of its largest population centers in both Iraq and Syria, including Mosul and Raqqa, to US and allied military forces; lost its final piece of territory in Baghuz, Syria in March 2019; has since transitioned to an insurgency, reverting to guerrilla warfare and more traditional terrorist tactics, developing sleeper cells, and assimilating into the broader population in Iraq and Syria where it continues to maintain a considerable presence and conduct operations in 2020

goals – replace the world order with a global Islamic state based in Iraq and Syria, expand its branches and networks globally, and rule according to ISIS’s strict interpretation of Islamic law

leadership and organization – Hajji Abdullah al-‘IFRI ((aka Abu Ibrahim al Hashemi al QURAYSHI (also QURAISHI), Amir Muhammad Said Abdal Rahman al-Mawla, Haji Abdallah, Qardash)) became the ISIS leader (emir) in late 2019 following the death of al-BAGHDADI in October; al-‘IFRI and a senior shura council determine the group's strategic direction and appoints the heads of provinces; an "appointed committee" is reportedly charged with security, finances, religious matters, and media operatons; the group typically operates in small cells or groups of 15 or fewer in Iraq and Syria

areas of operation – core operations remain predominately in Iraq and Syria; operational in the rural and desert areas of central and northern Iraq, primarily within and near Sunni populations with some presence in major population areas; maintains a presence throughout Syria but is primarily active in the northeast (Homs and Dayr az Zawr provinces), as well as the deserts of the east; claims named external branches, networks, or wilayat (provinces, governorates) in more than 20 countries: Afghanistan (Khorasan), Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Central Africa (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique), East Asia (Philippines, Indonesia), Greater Sahara (tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger), India, Libya, the Caucasus (Russia), Pakistan, Sinai Peninsula (Egypt), Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia, Turkey, West Africa (northeastern Nigeria, southeastern Niger, northern Cameroon, areas of Chad around Lake Chad), and Yemen; local terrorist groups in other countries, such as Lebanon and Sudan, have pledged allegiance to ISIS; has supporters, sympathizers, and associates worldwide and has inspired or conducted attacks in Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Iran, Maldives, Russia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tajikistan, Turkey, the UK, and the US; authorities in other countries, including, but not exclusive to, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, and the Netherlands have arrested ISIS members or supporters or disrupted plots linked to ISIS; maintains a strong online presence and continuously calls for attacks against Western countries and their interests around the world; individuals inspired by its ideology may conduct operations without direction from the ISIS’s central leadership

targets, tactics, and weapons – targets governments or groups that oppose its hardline Islamist ideology, including military forces and security services, government officials, perceived Sunni rivals, Westerners, and religious and ethnic minorities; known for indiscriminate killings, mass executions, political assassinations, torture, kidnappings, rape and sexual slavery, forced marriages and religious conversions, conscripting children, publishing videos of beheadings, and using civilians as human shields; has engaged in the systematic destruction of antiquities, places of worship, monasteries, and other elements of the cultural heritage of ancient communities; attacks places of worship, shopping centers and markets, tourist sites, hotels, concert venues, restaurants, train stations, nightclubs, and government buildings; attacks on civilians typically involve the use of small arms, vehicle bombs, explosive vests, and ramming vehicles into crowds of people; employs guerrilla-style hit-and-run and terrorist attacks against military and security forces that include the use of ambushes, complex ground assaults, mortar and rocket attacks, road side bombs, and suicide devices; possesses a wide variety of weapons, including small arms, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, rockets, man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), anti-tank guided missiles, and a variety of improvised explosive devices

strength – estimated in late 2020 to have more than 10,000 fighters in Iraq and Syria, including approximately 5-6,000 in Iraq; the number of group members, supporters, or sympathizers elsewhere is unknown

note: from 2011-18, it is estimated that 40,000 to 50,000 individuals—mostly men—from more than 80 countries went to Iraq and Syria to join ISIS, including approximately 19,000 from the Middle East and North Africa, 7,000 from Eastern Europe, 6,000 from Western Europe, 6,000 from Central Asia, 1,000 from Southeast Asia, 1,000 from East Asia, 450 from South Asia, 350 from North America, 250 from Sub-Saharan Africa, and 150 from South America; all men, as well as some women, are believed to have received military training, with many acquiring combat experience; estimates on the numbers of individuals that have returned to their country of origin, died, or remain in Iraq and Syria are incomplete and vary

financial and other support – currently raises funds through ad hoc criminal activities, particularly kidnapping for ransom and extortion activities; also receives funds through private donations, crowd-sourcing, online humanitarian appeals, and investments in legitimate businesses; prior to 2019, received virtually of its funding from oil sales, taxation, and selling confiscated goods within areas it controlled in Iraq and Syria; the group currently holds no territory, which has significantly reduced its ability to generate, store, and transfer revenue, but it continues to draw on financial reserves accrued when it controlled territory (estimated in 2020 at more than $100 million); ISIS has armed itself with weapons it has captured, purchased through local arms trafficking networks, and produced on its own

designation – predecessor organization al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) was placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 17 December 2004

aka – ISIS-Bangladesh, Caliphate in Bangladesh; Caliphate’s Soldiers in Bangladesh; Soldiers of the Caliphate in Bangladesh; Khalifa’s Soldiers in Bengal; Islamic State Bangladesh; Islamic State in Bangladesh; Islamic State in Bengal; Dawlatul Islam Bengal; ISIB; Abu Jandal al-Bangali; Jammat-ul Mujahadeen-Bangladesh; JMB; Neo-JMB; New JMB

history – formed in 2014 out of ISIS’s desire to expand to the Indian Subcontinent; consists of individuals who defected from Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh and Jund at-Tawhid wal-Khilafah and pledged allegiance to ISIS; claimed responsibility for multiple small bombing attacks in 2019

goals – protect Muslims in Bangladesh from perceived injustices and, ultimately, establish an Islamic caliphate in the Indian subcontinent 

leadership and organization – leadership and organization unknown; Muhammad Saifullah OZAKI was reportedly the leader of ISIS-Bangladesh when it was formed; probably operates in a cell-based network

areas of operation – active throughout Bangladesh but operates primarily in Dhaka

targets and tactics – primarily targets military and security personnel but also activists, bloggers, academics, religious minorities, and foreigners (particularly Westerners); has attacked restaurants, places of worship, and crowds of civilians, typically with small arms, grenades, and improvised explosives devices, including suicide bombers; most deadly attack was a 2016 armed assault on a bakery in Dhaka, where the attackers used small arms, grenades, and machetes to kill 24 people

strength – unknown but estimated to have a few hundred armed supporters; following the 2016 attack in Dhaka, Bangladeshi security forces staged nationwide raids in which they claim to have killed or captured hundreds of the group’s members

financial and other support – funding sources are largely unknown but has received some support from ISIS

designation – placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 28 February 2018

aka – ISIS-Libya, Islamic State-Libya; IS-Libya; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Libya (ISIL-L); Wilayat Barqa; Wilayat Fezzan; Wilayat Tripolitania; Wilayat Tarablus; Wilayat al-Tarabulus

history – formed in 2014 when then ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-BAGHDADI dispatched operatives from Syria to establish a branch; claimed responsibility for its first operation, a suicide attack on a hotel in Tripoli, in January 2015; from 2015 to 2016, grew to as many as 6,000 fighters, established a stronghold in Sirte, and expanded operations into Libya’s oil producing region; from late 2016 to 2017, was driven from Sirte into the desert by Libyan forces, with assistance from the US military, while suffering heavy losses in personnel; since 2018, has altered its strategy to what it described as a nikayah (war of attrition) of guerrilla warfare and traditional terrorist tactics with small bands of fighters operating out of ungoverned spaces in Libya and conducting attacks throughout the country; conducted a number of small-scale attacks against local military and security services in 2020

goals – prevent the formation of a reunified Libyan state, secure control over the country’s oil resources and, ultimately, establish an Islamic caliphate in Libya

leadership and organization – current leader unknown; when ISIS-L held territory, its structure included three regionally-based provinces (wilayat) with defined state-like departments (diwans) and a hierarchal chain of command; reportedly currently operates in decentralized guerilla-style desert “brigades” and networked cells

areas of operation – unable to control any population centers, but continues to have some mobile desert camps in rural central and southern Libya; assessed to retain an undetermined number of dormant cells in some coastal cities

targets, tactics, and weapons – targets military and security forces, oil infrastructure, and entities or individuals associated with Libya's competing governments; targets include oil facilities, security checkpoints and police stations, and symbolic state targets such as Libya’s electoral commission headquarters and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; also kidnaps local notables for potential prisoner exchanges or ransom; attacks typically are hit-and-run and conducted with small arms and suicide bombers; weapons mostly include small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, light and heavy machine guns, landmines, and improvised explosive devices

strength – assessed in 2020 to have fewer than 100 fighters

financial and other support – ISIS core has provided ad hoc financial support; additional funding comes from smuggling and extortion, kidnappings for ransom, and external sources; has acquired weapons through captured Libyan military stockpiles and smuggling networks

designation - placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 19 May 2016

aka – ISIS in the Greater Sahara; Islamic State in the Greater Sahel; Islamic State of the Greater Sahel;  ISIS in the Islamic Sahel

history – emerged in May 2015 when Adnan Abu Walid al-SAHRAWI and his followers split from the al-Qaida-affiliated group al-Murabitoun and pledged allegiance to ISIS; ISIS acknowledged the group in October 2016; has carried out major attacks in the Sahel region, most notably on a joint US-Nigerien military force in October 2017 in the Tonga region along the Niger-Mali border; since February 2018, has clashed repeatedly with French military forces and allied local militias operating under the French-sponsored counterterrorism operation known as Operation Barkhane, as well as Nigerien, Malian, and Burkinabe troops; for example, conducted attacks against Nigerien and Malian military bases in late 2019 that killed 71 and 54 soldiers, respectively; after a period of some reported cooperation, ISIS-GS was engaged in fighting in 2020 with the local al-Qa’ida-aligned coalition known as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) over territory and JNIM defectors; ISIS-GS has a close relationship with ISIS-West Africa

goals – replace regional governments with an Islamic state; reportedly has not developed a cohesive, ideologically driven narrative but instead tries to adapt its message to what can garner the most support from local communities

leadership and organization – led by Adnan Abu Walid al-SAHRAWI (al-Sahraoui); organization unknown, but probably operates in small mobile cells or groups that consolidate for operations

areas of operation – mostly concentrated in the Mali-Niger border region but also operates in Burkina Faso

targets, tactics, and weapons – targets local military and security forces, foreign military forces (French, UN, US), ethnic groups, local government officials, and schools; since 2018, has forced the closure of an estimated 2,000 schools in the region with threats, attacks, and murders of teachers and administrators; uses guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against military and security forces, including ambushes, targeted killings, hit-and-run attacks, mortar attacks, road side bombs, car and truck bombs, suicide bombers, and direct assaults; ISIS-GS fighters attacking Malian and Nigerien military bases in 2019 used assault rifles, light machine guns, motorcycles, trucks mounting machine guns, mortars, and suicide bombers

strength – precise numbers unknown but estimated in 2020 to have about 500 fighters; tries to exploit the grievances of marginalized communities and stoke ethnic tensions to bolster recruitment and support

financial and other support – specific sources unknown, but probably originates from smuggling activities, local donations and taxation, kidnapping for ransom, and from other groups operating in the region

designation – placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 23 May 2018

aka – Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Khorasan; Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khurasan (ISIL-K); Islamic State Khurasan (IS, ISK, ISISK); Islamic State of Iraq and Levant in Khorasan Province (ISKP); Islamic State's Khorasan Province; ISIL-Khorasan; Wilayat al-Khorasan; Wilayat Khurasan; ISIL's South Asia Branch; South Asian Chapter of ISIL

history – formed in January 2015 primarily from former members of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; ISIS appointed former Pakistani Taliban commander Hafiz Said KHAN as leader (later killed in a US military strike); frequently fights with the Afghan Taliban over control of territory and resources; also has conducted an insurgency against Afghan, Coalition, and US military forces; has suffered heavy losses of fighters, leadership, and territory due to counterterrorism operations, but as of late 2020 continued to retain the ability to orchestrate attacks, recruit, and replenish leadership positions

goals – establish an Islamic caliphate in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and parts of Central Asia, including Iran; eliminate Western influence and Shia Muslims

leadership and organization – Matiullah KAMAHWAL became the group's leader after Abdullah ORAKZAI (aka Aslam Farooqi) was captured by Afghan security services in April 2020; operates in small cells; ISIS restructured the Khorasan Province in May 2019, when it announced the creation of separate provinces for India and Pakistan

areas of operation – mainly operates in eastern Afghanistan (particularly Kunar and Nangarhar provinces) and western Pakistan (note: “Khorasan” is a historical region that encompassed northeastern Iran, southern Turkmenistan, and northern Afghanistan)

targets, tactics, and weapons – targets military and security forces, Taliban members, and civilians, particularly Shia Muslims and religious minorities; known for indiscriminate attacks against civilians in both Afghanistan and Pakistan; killed an estimated 1,200 Afghan and more than 300 Pakistani civilians in armed assaults, assassinations, executions, and suicide bombings between 2016 and 2019; targets included Shia religious sites, neighborhoods, and other gathering places, diplomatic facilities in Kabul, a voter registration center, a television station, a hospital, and an election rally; in August 2020, conducted a raid on an Afghan prison that killed or wounded 80 and freed up to 400 prisoners, including ISIS-K and Taliban loyalists; employs a combination of guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against Afghan, US, and Coalition military forces; typically armed with small arms, light and heavy machine guns, mortars, rockets, and various improvised explosive devices, including car bombs, road side bombs, and suicide bombers

strength – approximately 2,000 fighters in 2020, although estimates range between 1,000 and more than 3,000

financial and other support – receives periodic funding from ISIS; raises additional funds locally from commerce, taxes, and extortion practices on individuals and businesses

designation – placed on the US Department of State's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations on 14 January 2016

note: this appendix provides short descriptions of identified or self-proclaimed ISIS branches, networks, and provinces that have not been designated by the US State Department as Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Algeria: the Islamic State declared the establishment of a province in Algeria (Wilayat al-Jazair) in November 2014; includes elements of a local terrorist organization known as Jund al-Khilafa; goal is to replace the Algerian Government with an Islamic state; targets security forces, local government figures, and Western interests; largely defunct due to heavy pressure from Algerian security forces, although ISIS core claimed responsibility for a February 2020 attack on a military base near the border with Mali; historically maintained an operational and recruitment presence mostly in the northeastern part of the country

Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham network in Azerbaijan: ISIS declared a new network in Azerbaijan in July of 2019, although it has not claimed responsibility for any attacks; additional details of the network unavailable

Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Caucasus Province:  ISIS-Caucasus Province (ISIS-CP; aka Wilayat Qawqaz) was announced in June 2015; grew out of the former al-Qa’ida-affiliated Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus, which suffered from losses to Russian counterterrorism operations, leadership disputes, and defections to ISIS; claimed responsibility for its first attack against a Russian Army barracks in September 2015; operates in the North Caucasus area of the Russian Federation between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea; typically conducts attacks against local security and military forces, as well as non-Muslim civilians, with small arms, explosives, and knives

Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Central Africa (ISIS-CA) (aka ISIS – Democratic Republic of the Congo (ISIS-DRC); Islamic State’s Central Africa Province; ISCAP; Wilayat Central Africa; Wilayah Central Africa): first mentioned in an August 2018 speech by then-ISIS leader al-BAGHDADI; claimed its first attack against the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) military near the border with Uganda in April 2019; has its origins in the DRC-based militant group Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which ISIS has publicly claimed a branch; ADF was founded in 1995 with the stated goal of overthrowing the Ugandan government but later shifted to carrying out attacks against civilians, military forces, and UN peacekeepers in the DRC; ADF has Islamist roots, with many of its early members coming from Uganda’s Salafist movement; online posts by some ADF members in 2016 and 2017 referred to their group as Madinat Tawheed wal Mujahideen (“the City of Monotheism and Holy Warriors”) and displayed an ISIS-like flag; ISIS-CA operates in the DRC, primarily in the Nord Kivu and Ituri provinces, and its goal is to establish an Islamic state in Central Africa; has links to ISIS in Mozambique; attack methods include use of small arms, improvised explosive devices, and kidnappings; strength unknown; ADF was assessed in 2019 to have between 500 and 1,000 fighters in the DRC

Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – India: the Islamic State-India (aka ISI; Islamic State-Hin; Wilayah of Hind) was announced in May 2019 when ISIS claimed it had restructured the group’s Khorasan Province and created separate provinces for ISIS-affiliated elements operating in India and Pakistan; the announcement followed an attack claimed by ISIS on Indian security forces in India-administered Kashmir; ISIS-India is reportedly dominated by Kashmiri jihadists and has conducted several additional low-scale attacks targeting Indian security forces in Kashmir; estimated in 2020 to have less than 200 members; ISIS-linked groups reportedly operating in India include Ansar-ut Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind, Indian Mujahideen, and Junood-ul-Khilafa-Fil-Hind (aka Jundul Khilafa)

Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham –  East Asia networks in Indonesia: comprises a loose network of ISIS cells and supporters throughout the country known as Jemaah Anshorut Daulau (JAD), which Aman ABDURRAHMAN has led since 2015; goal is to replace the Indonesian Government with an Islamic state and implement ISIS’s interpretation of sharia; known for attacking security forces and Christians; in 2019, a JAD member attempted to assassinate Indonesia’s security minister and a local police chief; in 2018, staged simultaneous suicide bombings by families against three churches that killed more than 30 civilians; strength unknown, but maintains a clandestine operational presence across the country; JAD includes former members of the FTO-designated group Jemaah Anshortu Tauhid (JAT), which disbanded in 2015 to join JAD; falls under ISIS-East Asia leadership in the Philippines; also includes other radical groups in Indonesia that have pledged allegiance to ISIS, including the East Indonesia Mujahideen (MIT), which Indonesian police linked to an assault on a village in Sulawesi in late 2020 that killed four

Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham network in Mozambique: ISIS-Central Africa claimed that an ISIS network in Mozambique conducted its first attack against security forces in June 2019 in Cabo Delgado province, an area known for rich liquid natural gas deposits; the ISIS network is also known as a domestic terrorist group named Ansar al-Sunna (aka Ahl-e-Sunnat wal Jamaa; Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jammah; Swahili Sunna; al-Shabab) that  has conducted an insurgency against the Mozambique Government since 2017 and pledged allegiance to ISIS that same year; attacks by the groups are characterized by ambushes of government security forces and foreign private security contractors, indiscriminate killing of civilians, including women and children, beheadings, kidnappings, and looting and burning out villages; violence associated with the insurgency has reportedly led to the deaths of more than 2,000 civilians and displaced over 300,000 persons since late 2017

Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham - Pakistan: ISIS announced in May 2019 that it restructured the group’s Khorasan Province and created separate provinces for ISIS-affiliates operating in Pakistan, such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan; operates mostly in Baluchistan Province and chiefly targets non-Muslims and the local Shia population, particularly the Hazaras; in January 2020, claimed responsibility for an attack on a Shia mosque in Quetta, the capital of the Baluchistan province

Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham – Somalia: announced in 2016; splinter group of al-Shabaab and reportedly founded by former al-Shabaab commander Abdulqadir MUMIN; includes approximately 100-300 fighters operating primarily in the remote mountains of the Bari area of the semi-autonomous Puntland region; primarily targets Somali Government and security forces, Puntland security forces, African Union peacekeepers, and al-Shabaab elements through targeted assassinations using small arms and improvised explosive devices

Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham network in Tunisia: a network of cells, supporters, and Islamic militant groups in Tunisia claiming allegiance to ISIS, including Jund al-Kilafah (JAK or “Soldiers of the Caliph”); goal is to replace the Tunisian government with an Islamic state and implement ISIS’s strict interpretation of sharia; has conducted periodic attacks, including suicide bombings, against security forces in Tunis and attacked tourist sites frequented by Westerners, such as a resort in Sousse and a museum in Tunis in 2015; maintains its strongest presence in the central mountainous region around Kasserine, Sidi Bou Zid, and Gafsa

Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham –Turkey: publicly announced in July 2019, when ISIS released a video of a group of fighters in Turkey pledging allegiance to then-ISIS leader al-BAGHDADI and declaring a new province (wilayat) in Turkey; the speaker threatened both Turkey and the US while the fighters in the video were armed with assault rifles, grenades, light machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenade launchers; ISIS has long had a presence in Turkey, which previously served as a transit point for foreign fighters traveling to Syria to join the self-declared Islamic State caliphate and participate in the civil war; prior to the declaration of a province in Turkey, the Turkish government suspected ISIS of responsibility for numerous attacks, including suicide bombings at Ataturk Airport in June 2016 and at a wedding in August 2016, as well as a shooting at a nightclub in January 2017

Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham - Yemen:  publicly announced in April 2015 after a self-proclaimed ISIS affiliate calling itself “Wilayat Sana’a” claimed responsibility for a mosque bombing in Yemen that killed approximately 140 people; goal is to replace the Yemen Government and the Huthi rival government with an Islamic state and implement ISIS’s strict interpretation of sharia; led by Nashwan al-ADANI; since 2015, has carried out hundreds of attacks against Yemeni security forces, Yemeni Government facilities and personnel, Huthi forces, Shia Muslims, and al-Qa’ida; methods include suicide bombers, car/truck bombs, road side bombs, ambushes, armed ground assaults, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations; operational primarily in south and central Yemen; reportedly has suffered heavy losses in fighting with the local al-Qa'ida affiliate (al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Pensinsula)